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An industry’s dominant logic is the general scheme of value creation and capture 
shared by its actors. In high technology fields, technological discontinuities are not 
enough  to  disrupt  an  industry’s  dominant  logic.  Identifying  the  factors  that  might 
trigger change in that logic can help companies develop strategies to enable them to 
capture  greater  value  from  their  innovations  by  disrupting  that  logic.  Based  on 
analyzing the changes that biotechnologies and bioinformatics have brought to the 
drug industry, we identify and characterize three triggers of change that can create 
disruptive business models. We suggest that, in mature industries experiencing strong 
discontinuities and high technological uncertainty, entrants’ business models initially 
tend to fit into the industry’s established dominant logic and its value chains remain 
unchanged.  But  as  new  technologies  evolve  and  uncertainty  decreases,  disruptive 
business  models  emerge,  challenging  dominant  industry  logics  and  reshaping 








































1.  INTRODUCTION 
Biotechnology and bioinformatics have brought strong technological discontinuities to the 
traditional ways of discovering and developing drugs. Research in technology innovation and 
management  offers  multiple  definitions  of  terms  around  innovation  and  technology 
management  (Yanez  et  al.,  2010).  Technological  discontinuities  are  “those  rare, 
unpredictable innovations which advance a relevant technological frontier by an order-of-
magnitude and which involve fundamentally different product or process design”(Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990) but - surprisingly - those that have occurred in the drug industry seem 
(thus far) to have reinforced rather than challenged the positions of industry incumbents: the 
overall industry logics have not really changed, either in how business is done, or in how 
diseases are prevented or cured.  
Scholars have argued that technological discontinuities lead to industry shake-outs 
that can nullify incumbents’ competitive advantages (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel, 
2002;  Rothaermel  and  Hill,  2005).  An  emblematic  case  was  that  of  digital  photography 
(Benner, 2002; Munir and Phillips, 2005), where the technological discontinuities disrupted 
the dominant logic of the entire photographic industry and led to the reshaping of its value 
chain. We define the value chain as “the linked set of value-creating activities all the way 
through from basic raw material sources for component suppliers to the ultimate end-use 
product delivered into the final consumer’s hands” (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001) – and in 
this case, its reshaping allowed new competitors to enter the industry who introduced new 
ways of both creating and capturing value.  
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) originally defined dominant logic at the firm level as “the 







































decisions”. A dominant logic can keep organizations focused on the road ahead – or it may 
act as set of blinkers, restricting managers’ peripheral vision (Prahalad, 2004). Dominant 
industry  logics  evolve  and  change  over  time,  influencing  how  strategists  conceive  their 
business models and - in some cases - their company business model portfolios (Sabatier, 
Mangematin et al., 2010a). The evolution of dominant logics in high-tech industries has been 
recognized  as  being  driven  by  the  technologies  involved  (Afuah  and  Utterback,  1997). 
Industries follow general lifecycles from emergence to maturity (Agarwal and Tripsas, 2008), 
which are sometimes disrupted by technological discontinuities that may lead either to the  
industry’s decline, or to a new emergent phase (Afuah and Utterback, 1997). However, the 
drug industry, which has been facing several waves of technological discontinuities, does not 
seem  to  be  following  that  path  when  technological  discontinuities  occur  (Allarakhia  and 
Walsh,  2011;  Galambos  and  Sturchio,  1998;  Hopkins,  Martin  et  al.,  2007;  Rothaermel, 
2000), which questions the notion of drivers of evolution in technology based industries. But 
when technological discontinuity does not lead to disruptions of its dominant logic, what 
other  forces  lead  to  such  change?  The  aim  of  this  article  is  twofold:  to  provide  an 
understanding of the engines that drive the evolution of industry logics, and to propose a 
complement to current theories (Pavitt, 1984; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Winter, 1984) 
by  suggesting  that  technological  discontinuities  are  not  the  only  trigger  for  industry 
evolution. We argue that the convergence of business models from different industries can 
lead  to  challenges  to  dominant  logics.  While  technological  discontinuities  can  initiate 
industry evolution, business model innovation can also play a central role in driving change 
in dominant industry logics: so we examine how and why new business models emerge. 
The  pharmaceutical  industry  has  experienced  several  waves  of  technological 
discontinuities, any of which could potentially have led to the emergence of new industry 







































by interviewing industry experts and analyzing the business models of new entrants. Our 
findings  contribute  to  understanding  the  boom,  bust  and  recovery  of  biotechnology  and 
bioinformatics  by  following  the  stories  of  those  promising  technologies  that  encouraged 
stakeholders to believe in drug industry revolution. For years, entrepreneurial firms failed to 
deliver  the  expected  financial  and  scientific  performances  partly  because  they  found  it 
difficult to fit their business models into existing dominant industry logics in profitable ways 
(Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011; Bosse and Alvarez, 2010; Martin, Hopkins et al., 2010). But 
now,  by  testing  new  business  models,  young  entrepreneurial  entrants  are  renewing  the 
promise of their new technologies.  
The  article  first  explains  the  concepts  of  dominant  industry  logic  and  of  business 
models,  and  provides  insights  (based  on  industry  lifecycle  theory)  into  the  effects  of 
technological discontinuities on mature industries. We then describe our data collection and 
analysis methods, consider the drug industry’s established dominant logic, and analyze the 
business models of seven young bioinformatics companies. Next, we outline the triggers for 
change  in  the  industry’s  dominant  logic  -  new  healthcare  philosophies,  new  patterns  of 
collaboration, and new modes of network orchestration and finally discuss our findings and 
the links between industry evolution and business model innovation.  
 
2.  THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
1.1 The dominant logic of an industry 
Prahalad and Bettis have drawn on Kuhn’s work on the notion of a paradigm – “a way of 
defining and managing the world and a basis of action in that world” (Kuhn, 1962) – to argue 
that  managers  make  critical  resource  allocation  decisions  within  the  framework  of  a 







































at  the  firm  level,  first  from  diversification-driven  and  then  from  environmentally-driven 
organizational  change  approaches  (Bettis  and  Prahalad,  1995).  They  argue  that  actors 
evolving in the same industry develop similar mental maps of that industry, and that this 
dominant  industry-level  logic  can  be  seen  as  a  “mind  set  or  a  world  view  or 
conceptualization of the business and the administrative tools to accomplish goals and make 
decisions in that business” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). So the dominant logic provides a 
general  framework  within  which  industry  firms  conceive  what  their  customers  want  and 
define how to best serve their needs, and thus – depending on what opportunities they detect 
– design their strategies and business models. This shared logic guides the perceptions of top 
managers and leaders about how best to create and capture value in the industry, and so 
which  business  models  will  enable  their  company  to  be  profitable  –  but  they  also  risk 
becoming overly dependent on such mental models of their competitive landscape, leading to 
‘cognitive inertia’ (Hodgkinson, 1997). Phaal et al. (2011) identify three components of a 
dominant logic at the industry level: value context, value creation and value capture. The 
value context is the industrial landscape within which opportunities occur for creating and 
capturing  value,  and  value  creation  refers  to  “the  competences  and  capabilities  used  by 
organizations  to  generate  products  and  services”:  the  competencies  have  technology  or 
knowledge-based  components,  while  the  capabilities  are  rooted  more  in  processes  and 
business  routines  (Marino,  1996).  And  value  capture  refers  to  “the  mechanisms  and 
processes  used  by  organizations  to  appropriate  value  through  delivering  products  and 
services” (Phaal et al. 2011: 223). Von Krogh et al. (2000) also suggests a strong relationship 









































1.2 Business models  
The business model concept - a hot topic in research today (Baden-Fuller et al., 2010) - 
comes from practitioners of the late 1990s, and is seen as distinct from strategy: “strategy 
refers  to  the  choice  of  business  models  through  which  the  firm  will  compete  in  a 
marketplace”  (Casadesus-Masanell  and  Ricart,  2010).  Teece  (2010)  argues  that  business 
models translate leaders’ anticipations: “a business model reflects management’s hypothesis 
about what customers want, how they want it, and how an enterprise can best meet those 
needs, and get paid for doing so”. In his definition, a business model is organized around the 
hypothesis of what customers want, so the unit of analysis of a business model is its value 
proposal. Demil and Lecocq (2010) also argue that a business model refers to the articulation 
between  different  areas  of  a  firm’s  activity  designed  to  produce  a  value  proposition  for 
customers.  In  practice  several  different  value  propositions  may  coexist  within  a  specific 
industry, each of which may dictate the use of different business models based on services or 
products offered by firms at different steps of the industry’s value chain. The changes in 
managers’ perceptions of their firm’s opportunities will influence the continuous evolution of 
the business models it employs, and firms may manage a portfolio of contrasting business 
models to manage their risk, expected revenues and time to market more effectively (Sabatier 
et al., 2010a).  
Industry logics and business models are closely related. Depending on how they read 
their industry’s dominant logic, managers’ mindsets will comprise their perceptions about 
their firm’s environment and competitors (Gripsrud and Gronhaug, 1985; Hodgkinson and 
Wright, 2002) along with their anticipations as to their industry’s future (Doz and Kosonen, 
2010). These perceptions find expression in concrete leadership actions that can renew and 







































anticipations inaccurate: their reactions to how events actually turn out may engender the 
emergence of new and more effective business models. 
 
1.3 Technological and business discontinuities 
Technological  discontinuities  have  been  identified  as  major  triggers  of  change  in  fast-
evolving industries (Anand et al., 2010; Benner, 2010; Taylor and Helfat, 2009), and their 
effects have been well documented by such industry life cycle theorists as Klepper (1997) 
and  Utterback  and  Abernathy  (1975).  Synthesizing  contributions  from  technology 
management  literature,  evolutionary  economics  and  organization  ecology,  Agarwal  and 
Tripsas  (2008)  distinguish  three  stages  of  evolution  –  emergence/growth,  shake  out  and 
maturity – and identify the technological changes that drive firm performance and trigger 
industry  evolution  at  each  stage.  As  industries  and  their  technologies  evolve,  the  mature 
industry stage is characterized by competition between incumbents, low firm entry and exit 
rates,  and  incremental  innovations,  a  configuration  that  can  allow  for  the  profitably 
disintegration of value chains, allowing greater specialization of inputs and outputs that lead 
to improved efficiency and greater speed to market (Feldman, 2000; Herrigel, 1993; Storper, 
1997; Pollock, 2011). The advent of further technological discontinuities at this stage may 
either  speed  the  transition  from  maturity  towards  decline,  or  it  may  fuel  a  new  and 
reinvigorating cycle, taking the industry back to an emergent stage (Afuah, Utterback and 
1997; Agarwal and Tripsas, 2008; Phaal et al., 2011). At such times, when new entrants are 
trying to create and dominate nascent markets  (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) incumbents 
must avoid resource and routine rigidities (Gilbert, 1995). Both incumbents and new entrants 
will be attempting to identify correctly which are the industry’s most strategically valuable 







































with what customers find – or will find – valuable (Agarwal and Bayus, 2002), and make 
their business model decisions accordingly.  
While the industry life cycle literature underlines the importance of technology as a 
trigger for industry evolution, the drug industry presents a paradox that questions traditionally 
accepted theory. Biotechnology has been very innovative, often producing new versions of 
existing  products  using  completely  different  sets  of  technical  competencies  (Walsh  and 
Kirchhoff,  2002),  discarding  existing  processes  and  requiring  learning  processes  instead 
(Linton  and  Walsh,  2004).  These  technological  discontinuities  have  been  leading  to  the 
emergence of several different business models (Sabatier et al., 2010a) but did not suffice to 
disrupt the dominant logic of the drugs industry (Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011; Durand et al., 
2008;  Hopkins  et  al.,  2007;  Pisano,  2006).  In  other  words,  technological  discontinuities 
appeared to be necessary, but not sufficient in and of themselves, to trigger disruption of the 
dominant logic: iit seems that other triggers are necessary to drive this change in this case. 
We  suggest  that  it  is  only  when  technological  (or  other)  discontinuities  trigger  business 
model innovations that the industry’s logic evolves. Although we can observe how business 
models multiplied in this mature industry as it faced waves of technological discontinuities, 
we need to investigate what triggers might disrupt its dominant logic. 
 
2.   THE DRUG INDUSTRY: DOMINANT LOGIC AND BUSINESS MODELS  
2.1 Methodology 
Given our research question’s focus on the disruption of dominant industry logic, we adopted 
a two-step research process, looking at a macro-level view of evolutionary trends via an 
expert study, and a micro-level view through case studies (see Figure 1). Qualitative expert 







































first mobilized experts to map out the evolution of the drug industry, i.e. to characterize its 
anticipations and trajectories. During 2008 and 2009, we interviewed twenty-two experts, 
with between ten and forty years’ experience in the drug industry, and selected to represent 
the  industry’s  diversity,  including  managers  of  pharmaceutical,  biotechnology  and 
bioinformatics companies, researchers in academic laboratories, politicians, and leaders of 
world competitive clusters (see list in Appendix 1). We asked them first to focus on the 
industry’s  present  situation  (Which  businesses  appear  to  be  most  profitable?  How  do 
companies interact together? What are the drivers of the industry?), and then on its historical 
evolution  (How  did  new  entrants  insert  themselves  into  the  value  chain?  How  did 
biotechnology change in the industry? What has bioinformatics changed?), and lastly to build 
scenarios to describe possible drug industry futures. These scenarios were drawn on a very 
long term perspective and focused on new technologies, alliances or networks, and value 
chain  evolutions.  Our  interviews  continued  until  we  reached  theoretical  saturation 
(Eisenhardt,  1989;  Glaser  and  Strauss,  1967),  after  which  we  completed  this  first  data 
collection round with an extensive literature review on scientific, economical and managerial 
issues in the drug industry.  
 
Figure 1: A two-step research process 
Then, in order to see how companies’ emerging business models can challenge the 







































how  business  models  in  bioinformatics,  one  of  the  more  recent  waves  of  technological 
discontinuities, are setting the stage for the evolution of drug industry logics. This qualitative 
approach is appropriate, given our aim of trying to detect and describe an emerging and 
contemporary phenomenon (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) - 
observing complex on-going social phenomena in a real life context can reveal how firms 
propose  innovative  business  models  (Eisenhardt,  1989).  We  studied  multiple  companies, 
representing a range of new technologies, in order to draw the most accurate conclusions: “a 
major insight is to consider multiple cases as one would consider multiple experiments” (Yin, 
2003).  Our  cases  were  chosen  to  reveal  alternative  ways  of  doing  business  outside  the 
dominant logic, with the aim of detecting emerging patterns that contradicted existing norms. 
Consequently,  we  selected  polar  types  (Pettigrew,  1990)  that  differed  from  the  fully 
integrated business model, which has already been much studied, and which is associated 
with the dominant logic as described both by our experts and by drug industry literature 
(Fisken and Rutherford, 2002; Gassmann and Reepmeyer, 2005; Lane and Probert, 2007; 
Laroia  and  Krishnan,  2005;  Rothman  and  Kraft,  2006).  Searching  for  business  model 
innovation,  we  selected  seven  companies  that  are  bringing  new  technologies  to  the  drug 
industry, and thus potentially leading to new markets (for general company characteristics, 
see Appendix 2). Additional criteria for inclusion were that the companies must be young 
(less than fifteen years old) but have been in business for at least four years, both to ensure 
sufficient  information  and  to  eliminate  companies  and  business  models  that  -  while 
apparently novel or promising - have not yet been tested and therefore cannot be considered 
as representative of emerging new business models.  
To understand our case companies’ business models, we first interviewed each Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Scientific Officer and Chief Financial Officer separately using semi-







































their  functions  and  responsibilities,  and  compared  these  results  with  internal  documents: 
annual  reports,  roadmaps,  project  descriptions  etc..  Next,  we  collected  information  from 
scientific research journals, business journals, newspapers, trade magazines and specialist 
information  databases  to  build  a  detailed  description  of  each  firm’s  business  models. 
Following Miles and Huberman (1994), our analysis comprised three main steps: within-case 
analysis,  data  reduction  and  cross-case  analysis.  Data  from  each  case  were  analyzed 
separately to gain a general picture of the company, its business model(s) and its evolution 
since inception. Each business model was then summarized in a one-page description and 
sent to the interviewees, and discussed and corrected where necessary. In order to identify 
both  correspondences  with,  and  differences  from,  the  dominant  logic,  we  followed 
Eisenhardt’s  recommendations  (Eisenhardt,  1989;  Eisenhardt  and  Graebner,  2007)  in 
selecting dimensions and then looking for both within-group similarities and between-group 
differences. 
 
2.2 The drug industry’s dominant logic: expert study  
Our  expert  panel  described  the  industry’s  dominant  logic  as  having  three  general 
characteristics: strong orientation towards product innovations; extensive use of networks and 
alliances; and value chain stability. 
·  In terms of product innovations, the pharmaceutical industry has always been based on a 
drug discovery > product development > commercialization path: “This business is all 
about  finding  the  most  promising  drugs”  (expert  9);  “Discovery  is  the  heart  of  our 
business” (expert 16); “Investors are generally focused on drug candidates - this is what 
they find valuable” (expert 22). Since its origins in the late 19th century, the industry has 







































gradual  acceptance  of  the  germ  theory  of  disease  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  then 
accelerating  during  the  chemo-therapeutic  revolution  of  the  1930s  and  1940s  where 
pharmaceutical  companies  rapidly  industrialized  drug  discovery  and  development  and 
managed the entire drug value chain. In the 1940s and 1950s, progress in virology and 
then in microbial biochemistry and enzymology provided the basis for a new style of 
targeted pharmaceutical research and development (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). The 
industry  has  focused  on  mass  market  products,  and  its  leading  and  most  profitable 
companies (Pfizer, Roche Holdings, Sanofi-Aventis, Novartis, Amgen etc.) have based 
their  business  models  on  integrating  the  three  value  chain  activities  of  its  traditional 
development  path  (Datamonitor,  2010).  But  while  drug  industry  activities  address  the 
curative and preventive elements of treatment, the diagnostic field remains separate, from 
both the technological and business perspectives. The biotechnology1 and bioinformatics2 
fields (which emerged in the late 1970s and early 1990s respectively) introduced new 
research techniques (for example, tools for rational drug design and genetic engineering) 
and  computer  programs  to  understand  pathogenicity  and  disease  and  to  generate 
promising potential combinations of chemical and biological drug candidates, although 
these are still mainly employed in the service of drug discovery. 
 
1 Scientific discoveries in life sciences led to the emergence of modern biotechnology in the late 1970s. The 
term  ‘biotechnology’  embraces  many  different  technologies:  recombinant  vaccines,  recombinant  proteins, 
interferon, etc. 
2 Bioinformatics was born in 1990 with the advent of the Human Genome Project, which aimed to identify all 
the genes in human DNA, to determine the sequence of the 3 billion chemical base pairs that make it up, to store 
this information in databases and to develop and improve tools for analyzing the data. This advance catalyzed a 
drug  industry  race  to  find  new  drugs  and  led  to  the  emergence  of  many  bioinformatics  companies. 
Bioinformatics  provide  the  means  of  managing  and  analyzing  floods  of  data  using  statistical  methods  and 
technology, so bioinformatics products are generally combinations of software, databases and services which 
enable the efficient exploitation of data to identify the key functional information to understand how genes and 
proteins work together in interconnected networks. Bioinformatics knowledge is applied to improve the drug 
discovery process, so bioinformatics are becoming an essential element in biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies’ drug discovery processes. As in the biotech situation, new entrants in this field have mainly been 








































·  Networks and alliances have become much more extensively used in the drug industry 
since the emergence of biotechnology companies. Biotechnology has profoundly altered 
drug discovery heuristics and generated many new technologies for both discovery and 
development, bringing big technological discontinuities in terms of product and process 
innovation to the industry (Hopkins et al., 2007). During its emergence, most new biotech 
entrants were start-ups founded by scientists from universities and laboratories (Ebers and 
Powell, 2007) engaged in bridging upstream academic research, venture capital and large 
firms  (Rothaermel,  2001a).  Young  entrepreneurial  companies  also  tended  to  cluster 
geographically, locating themselves near to universities and other research centers (Su 
and Hung, 2009; van Geenhuizen and Reyes-Gonzalez, 2007). Alliances and partnerships 
became essential ways for the large companies to access young entrants’ innovations, and 
for the innovators, in turn, to access markets (Bianchi et al., 2011; Bradfield and El-
Sayed, 2009; Mittra, 2007; Rothaermel, 2000). Their structures generally involved large 
companies positioning their smaller innovative collaborators at the start of the value chain 
(Rothaermel, 2001b), and such network orchestration is seen as one of the drug industry’s 
three  main  activities  today  -  “Firms  need  to  be  able  to  collaborate  upstream  and 
downstream, with small or large companies” (expert 17); “Networks are orchestrated by 
large firms that know how to manage the whole drug development” (expert 12) - and as 
necessary  to  bring  together  all  the  dispersed  resources  required  for  the  whole  drug 
discovery  and  development  process  (Powell  et  al.,  1996;  Staropoli,  1998).  But  even 
though  the  discovery  process  has  been  transformed  by  biotechnology  tools  and  by 
bioinformatics, it is still typically orchestrated by the fully integrated large firms (Bosse 
and Alvarez, 2010; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Sabatier et al., 2010b), whose business 
models have evolved so as to fully integrate their internal and external competencies, with 







































·  The stability of the value chain is strong because of the fragmentation of the innovative 
work,  and  the  power  of  intellectual  property  rights  and  of  regulations  exerted  by 
government agencies. The innovative effort can be seen as being divided between the 
different actors along the value chain (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Pollock 2011), since 
the  nature  of  biotechnologies’  innovation  processes,  in  particular,  requires  the 
mobilization  of  complementary  knowledge  from  different  disciplines,  as  well  as  of 
different actors’ research and marketing expertise (Powell et al., 1996). The complexity of 
drug development and commercialization – and the fact that many of its steps can be 
achieved separately – has resulted in a fragmentation of the value chain that, in turn, has 
created  opportunities  for  specialized  companies  which  have  developed  competences, 
capabilities and knowledge in very specific technological and scientific drug development 
sectors:  “Because  of  the  complexity  of  the  process,  there  are  opportunities  for  many 
companies  in  the  development  of  specific  technologies”  (expert  5);  “A  technological 
solution developed in a lab can easily become the base for the creation of a company that 
can become a supplier to drug developers” (expert 2). The expertise of these specialized 
firms is the basis of their value proposal to their customers –the large companies who 
continue to orchestrate overall drug development (Nosella et al., 2005; Piachaud, 2002): 
taken together, all these business are, effectively, part of a general processes optimization 
activity. 
As the supposed3 cost of drug discovery, development and commercialization can exceed 
US$1Bn, and take ten to fifteen years to achieve (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007; DiMasi et 
al.,  2003),  intellectual  property  rights  are  used  throughout  the  drug  industry  to  protect 
discoveries,  technologies  and  products  (Thumm,  2004),  and  its  keenness  to  defend  and 
 
3 The figures often quoted in studies for drug development costs have been questioned by, for example, Relman 







































maintain the high returns from its IP rights - even when this stance is unfavorable to the 
needs of developing countries - has led to much criticism of the industry (De George, 2005; 
McGoey et al., 2011). Recent studies report both the general stability of IP rights in the drug 
industry (Lilico, 2006), but also that company’s policies with regard to those rights are slowly 
evolving (Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011).  
The value chain is also highly regulated by such governmental agencies as the Food 
and Drug Administration in the USA and the European Medicines Agency, both of which 
require candidate drugs to follow strict development paths and fulfill a range of regulatory 
demands. These agencies seek to normalize and control the conformity of the process (Hill 
and Johnson, 2004; Milne, 2006) and to deliver marketing authorization at its successful 
conclusion: their many regulatory requirements (which have also become embedded into the 
broader systems of healthcare, private insurance and state regulation in developed countries) 
inevitably constrain the speed of drug development, and have significant cost implications for 
companies. 
To summarize, as a general value creation and capture scheme, the dominant logic of 
the  drug  industry  is  product-based.  Its  value  chain  is  fragmented,  but  highly  regulated, 
enabling many small and medium actors to focus on process innovation and on realizing 
particular  links  in  the  chain.  Alliances  and  networks  are  essential  for  drug  discovery, 
development  and  commercialization,  and  are  generally  orchestrated  by  large  companies, 
which hold the central position in these networks. The dominant industry logic does not favor 
entrepreneurial  entrants’  value  capture  opportunities,  since  the  incumbents  who  are  their 
(only) customers both control the market end of the value chain and benefit from their central 
positions  within  networks  (Rothaermel  and  Hill,  2005;  Teece,  1986).  Thus,  although 
biotechnology and bioinformatics companies create value with the new drug candidates and 







































2009; Durand et al., 2008). Considering its future, Lilico argues that the highly regulated 
nature of the pharmaceutical industry leads to isomorphic and conservative behaviors and 
strategies (Lilico, 2006) which tend to reinforce its dominant logic. Rather than challenge 
their  power  and  position,  the  technological  discontinuities  brought  to  the  industry  by 
biotechnology and bioinformatics have reinforced the hegemony of the large pharmaceutical 
incumbents, who have learned to integrate sufficient of the new technologies to remain at the 
center of their networks, and who still control market access.  
 
2.3 Emerging business models as a seed of industry logic evolution 
The  seven  case  companies  studied  are  running  several  business  models,  some  of  them 
simultaneously,  of  four  separate  types  -  software  as  a  service;  platform  technologies; 
bundling;  collaborative  discovery  –  which  challenge  the  industry’s  dominant  logic  at 
different levels (see Table 1 for brief descriptions).  
 
Table 1: Brief descriptions of bioinformatics case companies’ four business models 
Business 
Model  Description  Companies 
Software as a 
service 
Value proposition: Enterprise solutions, consulting services and software to 
help with data management, sequence analysis, target identification, lead 
identification and optimization, drug development and formulation. 
Value capture: Fees from subscriptions to enterprise solutions and scientific 
operating platform and for consultancy services. Possible additional revenues 
from IP rights to software components. 
1 & 6 
Platform 
technology 
Value proposition: Innovative software and databases to improve drug 
discovery and development, development of new diagnostic kits, cosmetic 
research; custom consultancy services and software and database design. 
Value capture: Customers pay upon sale of software and database licenses and 
analysis services. 
1, 2, 3 & 4 
Bundling 
Value proposition: Providing a higher value software package for the customer 
through integration of its software into complementary software offer of a 
larger, well-established company. 
Value capture: A percentage of the revenues from the sales of the products into 




Value proposition: Collaboration with drug and diagnostics companies for 
discovery of new candidates through customization of in-house platforms to 
meet specifically defined customer goals. 







































Value capture: In the short term, the company is paid fees for services, but later 
receives royalties and revenue-sharing payments if the drug reaches the market. 
 
These  four  business  models  have  been  specifically  adapted  in  each  company. 
Company  1  modified  the  software  as  a  service  business  model  to  create  more  value  by 
addressing both the drug and the agricultural biotechnology industries, while company 6 uses 
the same business model to address the aerospace industry and consumer products, and also 
allied with a large computer company to develop what the experts describe as a ‘global care 
solution’ in healthcare, again under the same value proposal.  
All  our  sample  firms  deployed  the  platform  technology  business  model  at  their 
inception, but their models evolved differently according to the positions they took up in their 
respective networks. Thus, companies 1, 2, 3 and 4 have tried to gain more central roles and 
greater control over the drug discovery and development process by offering extra value – in 
terms of technology and drug-candidates – and in exchange for  greater rewards for their 
intellectual property, while company 5 already occupies a central role in a drug development 
network. We also noted that companies 2 and 3 use the same value proposal to address the 
drug and the agricultural biotechnology industries, while company 2 also employs it towards 
the diagnostics industry. 
The bundling business model (used by company 4), contradicts the dominant industry 
logic in terms of how the company accesses its clients, i.e. in presenting itself as an essential 
partner  rather  than  as  a  supplier.  The  company  is  at  the  center  of  innovation  networks 
developing new products, and allies with large firms from the IT, diagnostics and laboratory 
equipment sectors.  
Companies 5 and 7 use the collaborative discovery business model to ally with large 







































central role in the architecture of its network. The partnership and joint R&D aspects of these 
alliances  are  significant  in  business  model  innovation  terms,  since  they  require  new 
approaches  to  collaboration  and  property  rights  ownership  where  partners,  rather  than 
addressing the mass product markets, collaborate with individual patients in designing one-
off personalized or group-specific treatments. 
 
3.  RESULTS: TRIGGERS FOR INDUSTRY DISRUPTION 
Both our experts and the managers of the studied companies agree that, while technological 
discontinuities  have  a  great  impact  on  products  and  processes,  they  do  not  disrupt  the 
dominant industry logic per se: rather they - and our business model analysis - suggest three 
main triggers that can change the industry logics: transformations in healthcare philosophies, 
new patterns of collaboration, and the collapse of the previous patterns of orchestration and 
integration.  
 
3.1 New healthcare philosophies  
Our experts often repeated their opinion that, in the long run, as new healthcare technologies 
emerge  and  converge,  they  will  lead  us  to  a  more  holistic  industry.  New  approaches  to 
healthcare – such as personalized medicine, nanobiotechnology, theranostics, and systems 
biology  –  are  presenting  physicians  and  hospitals  with  new  therapeutic  principles,  which  
build new ways to address patients’ needs – and so open up new business opportunities.  
Personalized  medicine  involves  analyzing  the  patient’s  unique  genetic  profile  and 
molecular characteristics to enable the design of targeted patient-specific therapies, as well as 







































(Ginsburg  and  McCarthy,  2001).  Personalized  medicine  promises  to  improve  both  the 
efficacy and safety of medical treatment for each patient: “with this kind of approach, a 
doctor will be able to choose the best adapted treatment, at the lowest levels of toxicity for 
their  patients.  But  it  requires  the  integration  of  biomolecular  tests  upstream  in  the  drug 
development value chain” (expert 4). This approach would radically reshape the value chain 
and therefore the dominant industry logic: “in personalized medicine, the value is no longer 
in the product, but in the service” (expert 15). Remedies and services will be adapted to each 
patient, thus altering the current balance of treatment costs for patients, governments and 
private  insurers,  as  well  as  of  how  companies  capture  value.  This  approach  would  also 
question  the  drug  industry’s  traditional  quest  for  ‘block  buster’  drugs,  and  open  up  the 
possibilities of disruptive new business models. 
Nanobiotechnology,  defined  as  the  applications  of  nanotechnologies  in  the  life 
sciences (Briquet-Laugier and Ott, 2006), offers the promise of a convergent approach that 
could merge diagnosis, treatment and monitoring, as well as improving diagnostics and drug 
delivery  so  as  to  cut  the  quantity  and  toxicity  of  drugs  injected  into  patients.: 
“Nanobiotechnology could help the development of healthcare at home: for example it could 
help the elderly to stay at home. We could follow their health with an implanted chip that 
detects physiological variations and sends messages to equipment in their room, and alarms 
to  a  team  of  doctors,  if  necessary.  It  could  even  activate  the  appropriate  medicine 
automatically”  (expert  6).  Again,  this  approach  is  likely  to  create  new  patterns  of  value 
creation and capture, involving software ventures as well as diagnostics and drugs companies.  
The  theranostics  approach  can  be  defined  as  the  use  of  highly  specific  tests  for 
diagnosing disease, followed by the implementation of a therapeutic approach which adjusts 
treatment according to predicted disease development patterns. As in the previous approach, 







































administer the most appropriate and least harmful regimen (Amir-Aslani and Mangematin, 
2010).  “The  promises  of  theranostics  are  renewed  now  we  made  a  lot  of  progress  in 
diagnostics”  (expert  10).  Theranostics  could  redefine  ways  of  choosing  and  delivering 
treatment, and thus create new business opportunities, employing models that find new ways 
of sharing the value captured between the companies involved in detecting and curing the 
disease.  
The systems biology approach is quite recent and aims to describe and predict the 
functioning  of  living  systems  from  the  knowledge  of  their  components  and  inter-
relationships,  as  a  result  of  both  experience  and  modeling  (Roux  and  Xavier,  2007).  By 
integrating,  analyzing  and  combining  all  the  information  revealed  by  recent  advances  in 
genomic, transcriptomic and proteomic approaches, it promises to support a holistic approach 
to treatment: “with systems biology we can take into account the impact of a drug on the 
target disease but also its impact on the whole system” (expert 8). Again, this approach has 
the potential to create new business models which would reward, for example, companies 
who can use the technology to forecast the whole impact of drugs on patients. 
The emerging business models, especially “software as a service” and “bundling”, 
which  build  on  these  new  healthcare  philosophies,  represent  emerging  challenges  to  the 
dominant drug industry logic. The shift from products to services transforms products into 
commodities,  where  the  added  value  is  created  by  the  companies’  ability  to  use 
bioinformatics to match treatments against patients’ individual genetic profiles. As Allarakhia 
and Walsh (2011) suggest, solutions that involve biology, nanotechnology and computational 
sciences in combination question the value of the accumulated knowledge assets and their 
associated intellectual property which are implicit in the current paradigm. Our case studies 
reveal  that  these  new  healthcare  philosophies  –  which  try  to  promote  more  holistic 







































dedicated firms working in new types of partnership with large companies from beyond the 
established pharmaceutical industry. And it is this factor - the entry of incumbents from 
different industries - that is likely to provide a strong driver for change in the drug industry’s 
dominant logics. 
 
3.2 New patterns of collaboration 
In the new shape of the drug industry implied in the previous paragraphs, new patterns of 
collaboration will transform the traditional balance between value creation and value capture. 
The  switch  from  product  to  service  logics  will  create  new  value  capture  zones,  and  the 
changes  in  the  drug  industry  balance  of  power  -  as  large  incumbents  from  other  sectors 
(diagnostics, electronics, IT, etc.) enter to explore and exploit the opportunities opened by 
new technologies and new healthcare philosophy visions - will challenge the domination of 
the large established biopharmaceutical firms. New entrants from other industries are soon 
going to propose new approaches to drug discovery, development and commercialization that 
are no longer based on the specific, complementary assets developed by the pharmaceutical 
industry  incumbents,  whose  established  appropriation  mechanisms  -  and,  indeed,  whose 
whole market position and power – will be questioned. The realization of these new business 
models could change both how clinical trials are carried out and how these new services are 
commercialized, so that the capacity to manage the final drug value chain steps is no longer a 
complementary asset specific to incumbent pharmaceuticals. Such changes are likely to lead 
to the renegotiation of the comparative power of the various value-chain actors, opening up 
the chance for a new balance between their value creation and capture opportunities. This can 
already be seen operating in bioinformatics companies, who are beginning to claim more 







































partners  helps  the  innovating  firms  gain  more  royalties  from  the  final  product,  and  their 
partners less than they would have done under the previous dominant logic, but enables both 
to  capture  value  from  delivering  the  service  to  patients.  We  can  already  observe  these 
disruptive new business models building on technological discontinuities to change the ‘old’ 
ways in which value has been created and captured along the value chain. 
And there is another significant driver: developing and emerging countries, who need 
affordable  drugs  and  treatments,  are  searching  for  alternative  ways  to  fulfill  their  wants, 
questioning intellectual property rights policies (De George, 2005, McGoey et al., 2011), and 
calling  for  more  generic  drugs:  “some  developing  countries  are  re-engineering  drugs  or 
vaccines in order to produce them cheaper and exempt from IP rights” (expert 13). These 
countries are simultaneously promoting drug and diagnostic technologies, with the result that, 
for example, cheap point-of-care solutions are almost on the market. “It is possible to develop 
a small test, for US$0.3, which can tell you, in the middle of nowhere, if a patient has one of 
the 30 diseases for which you are screening. Developing countries are not the only ones to 
call for less costly drugs and treatments, private insurers in developed countries are also 
searching for ways to cut the cost of healthcare. They are starting to take interest in the drug 
development process, and trying to intervene upstream in its value chain” (expert 3). Such 
calls for new ways to prevent and cure diseases favor the emergence of new players, and 
production capacities are emerging worldwide, especially in India and China. The end of 
patent protection periods for some established drug products and the emergence of low cost 
generic drugs are both threatening existing pharmaceutical firms, and are being challenged 
from both sides: small firms that are destabilizing and redesigning the drug value chain, and 










































3.3 Orchestration or Integration  
Another trigger for industry logic change revealed by our study is the emergence of new 
networks.  Small  firms  (our  experts  also  call  them  ‘virtual  companies’)  are  beginning  to 
coordinate whole networks to discover, develop and commercialize drugs, orchestrating parts 
(or even all) of the drug development and commercialization route: “small companies, with 
teams of five, can develop drugs from research to clinical trials” (expert 10). Given the 
complexity of this task, these virtual companies need strong scientific teams to lead such 
development: “it requires an excellent chief scientific director who understands the whole 
process” (expert 8). But this development of the industry logic illustrates how small firms are 
acquiring  competence  in  network  orchestration  which,  until  recently,  had  been  the  sole 
province of large firms (Sabatier et al., 2010b; Weisenfeld et al., 2001). This trigger is also 
linked to a new and different vision of the future for the drug industry, one where these small 
virtual firms seek alliance partners other than the traditional large biopharmaceuticals, and 
where  they  create  networks  of  SMEs  which  also  include  (maybe  large)  companies  from 
outside the industry: “it is not easy, but not impossible, for a small company to orchestrate a 
network in which there is a large incumbent. Virtual companies can create networks of small 
biotech  firms,  but  may also  need  to  find  external  partners”  (expert  6).  In  fact,  it  is this 
process - in which small firms search for new partners and new ways to do business – that is 
opening the door to large diversified entrants.  
Table  2  sums  up  the  main  mechanisms.  The  case  studies  show  that  firms  are 
challenging the dominant industry logic with new business models that are disruptive in how 







































new value chains which redistribute the value created from IP rights, that give SMEs more 
central roles in networks, and which help large diversified entrants enter the industry. The 
triggers identified by our expert commentators are already materializing in the form of new 
firm business models, which are summarized in the right-hand column.  
 
Table 2: Triggers for change in dominant logic and challenging business models 








New alliances with large diversified 
companies. Shift from product to service 
logic: drug is a commodity; service is 
where value is captured. New value chain, 




Entry of new players from other industries 
Developing countries searching for new 
ways to innovate, 
Private insurances and developing 
countries trying to lower the cost of drugs. 
Large diversified companies as new 
entrants. 
Redistribution of rewards of IP rights. 
Orchestration/i
ntegration 
Innovation networks orchestrated by 
virtual firms rather than large firms. 
Young entrants taking more central roles 
in their alliances with large companies 
from other industries. 
 
The activities of these small companies show the new vision of the drug industry 
being ‘made flesh’. Companies 5 and 6 are already involved, respectively, in theranostics and 
systems  biology  projects  within  alliances  with  actors  that  are  external  to  the  established 
industry.  The  proximity  of  bioinformatics  to  software  technologies  facilitates  these  new 
collaborative patterns, as does the convergence of their technologies (as in biochips4, for 
example). Recent progress in the molecular biology, genetic engineering, genomics and post 
genomics fields has generated a great deal of data that needs to be extracted, processed and 
integrated; so these alliances have not yet led to products being brought to the market, but 
some  projects  are  progressing  well.  Other  initiatives  are  promoting  diagnostic  and  drug 
 
4  Biochips  can  take  different  forms  (DNA  Microarray,  protein  chips,  etc)  and  have  in  silico  or  in  vivo 
applications  to  aid  diagnosis  or  to  release  drugs  in  the  body.  Biochips  require  very  recent  technological 
developments  from  biotechnologies  and  bioinformatics,  as  well  as  knowledge  in  the  science  of  micro-
miniaturization from the semi-conductor industry (see for example Levine, P.M., 2009, Active CMOS biochips 







































services  as  substitutes  to  existing  products,  which  confirms  the  notion  of  emerging  and 
converging technologies acting as triggers for new value proposals. The fact that the new 
industry entrants are very different from their predecessors may mark the moment-of-shift in 
the dominant logic. As bioinformatics companies manage the information systems that are 
key to value creation, they gain network centrality and their status changes from supplier to 
network leader, orchestrating the different participants of new value chains. Six of the seven 
companies we analyze are playing this kind of central role - as orchestrator and manager of 
network  information  flows  -  which  gives  them  increased  control  over  the  whole 
product/service development, again opening up new avenues for greater value capture.  
 
4.  DISCUSSION  
Value  chain  orchestration,  the  power  of  centrality  and  the  possession  of  complementary 
assets  represent  different  ways  in  which  large  network  players  used  to  secure  value 
appropriation  in  the  prior  industry’s  dominant  logic.  When  technological  discontinuities 
enable change at the technological level and facilitate the entry of new players, new business 
models  emerge  which  may  transform  the  dominant  logic,  especially  if  several  triggers 
converge.  
4.1 Discontinuities and incumbents 
Even when they are introducing breakthrough technologies, entrants entering a new industry 
must conform to its dominant logic at first - that is, their business models must initially fit 
within  its  established  value  chain  and  match  existing  client  and  supplier  expectations, 
defining a recognized and specific value proposition for the industry’s existing players, and 
thus reinforcing its dominant logic. New entrants into the drug industry have typically found 







































with  them  in  networks  they  orchestrate.  The  control  of  complementary  assets  these 
incumbents  have  enjoyed  hitherto  has  protected  them  against  the  disruption,  first  of 
biotechnology and more recently of bioinformatics companies, and they have also been able 
to integrate the new knowledge coming from these fields, both internally via mergers and 
acquisitions  of  biotechnology  and  bioinformatics  companies,  and  externally  through 
collaborative agreements. So established pharmaceutical firms have retained their ability to 
orchestrate and manage external competencies on a routine basis, including the technological 
discontinuities introduced by new entrants, within their existing orchestration patterns, and 
thus within their value chains. In other words, the disruptive nature of new technologies does 
not automatically change an industry’s dominant logic – the challenge comes later, when 
business  models  evolve  and  when  small  firms  can  ally  with  other  actors,  either  new  or 
already existing, that promote a different set of complementary assets. In this case, the entry 
of large diversified actors from other industries has been one of the triggers of the disruption 
of the dominant industry logic.  
When  technological  discontinuities  are  introduced  into  an  existing  industry,  they 
confront  an  existing  industrial  organization,  established  market  relationships,  specifically 
developed  assets,  and  stable  and  predictable  collaboration  patterns.  Technological 
discontinuities do not change dominant industry logics until they begin to usher in different 
business  models  that  modify  asset  specificities,  create  new  dependency  ties  and  reshape 
collaboration  patterns,  and  thus  change  players’  appropriation  strategies,  modifying  the 
balance  between  intellectual  property  rights,  asset  specificity  and  bilateral  collaboration. 
Even if a breakthrough technology is involved, as long as it can be integrated within the 
existing industry value chain, it will not alter the balance of power between its actors or its 
established appropriation modes. But when one of these components is affected, dominant 







































business model innovation and proliferation, and it is these changes that trigger the disruption 




4.2 New business models as challenges to the dominant logic 
Studying  other  industries  makes  it  clear  that  the  introduction  of  new  business  models 
challenges dominant industry logics: for example in the music industry, the development of 
such technologies as high-speed broadband internet access and software has made digital 
content  and  information  and  its  delivery  increasingly  ubiquitous  (Wunsch-Vincent  and 
Vickery, 2004). As long as new entrants are only small entrepreneurial firms, incumbents can 
maintain the dominant logic of their industries for a while, but as the technology matures and 
becomes  widely  accepted  and  well-diffused,  new  business  models  emerge.  Low  property 
rights will speed up this adoption and diffusion: in the music and photographic industries, 
dematerialization – the change from materials like CDs or negatives to digital media – and 
the absence or weakness of  IP rights over digital contents decreased the power of rights 
owners, so that value capture mechanisms changed from being based (mainly) on products to 
being based on the services offered around the products. In the photographic industry, new 
digital technologies rendered all the established property rights over silver photography film 
and  developing  technologies  obsolete.  In  the  same  way,  progress  in  biotechnology  and 
bioinformatics points towards the dematerialization of the drug industry, challenging existing 
dominant  logics  by  creating  opportunities  for  new  business  models  to  match  customers’ 







































create opportunities for new products and process, and thus fuel new business models.  
When large diversified entrants enter (from the semiconductor industry, for example, 
in the case of the drug industry), dominant logics are disrupted by the arrival of business 
models from other industry sectors, just as the iTunes business model disrupted the music 
industry status quo. In the drug industry, the dominant logic created tensions at the value 
capture level, where recent biotechnology and bioinformatics entrants have been unable to 
capture as much value as they think they create: their response (deliberate or not) has been to 
use new technological approaches to seek a better equilibrium, in particular by allying with 
large diversified entrants from the IT and diagnostics industries. The switch from a product to 
a service logic in the drug industry promises to have a strong transformative impact on both 
the  supply  side  (for  both  established  players  and  new  entrants)  and  the  demand  side  (in 
offering  new  preventive  and  curative  cares).  By  reshaping  the  value  chain,  creating  new 
alliances and offering new value proposals, young drug industry entrants are re-negotiating 
how they both create and capture value. Their dissatisfaction with the established value chain 
patterns – which deny them the chance to capture the value they create - is contributing to the 
fragmentation and destruction of those chain structures, opening the door for large diversified 
companies from other industries to enter via alliances and partnerships. 
It seems that business models innovations follow technological innovation – and when 
they  appear  (even  following  quite  minor  technological  innovations,  like  Facebook,  or 
Napster)  they  introduce  new  logics  into  the  industry.  When  business  model  innovations 
follow major technological breakthroughs, a delay is required before the technology can be 
set up and specific assets and capabilities built and deployed, during which time established 
value chains prove adaptable enough to accommodate emerging innovative technologies. But, 
when actors - by themselves or via alliances - are powerful enough to promote new business 







































logic is challenged, and evolves.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
We can see here the beginnings of a new industry that will emerge from the upheaval of the 
established  drug  industry  and  its  merging  with  the  diagnostics  and  other  industries.  This 
observation echoes the findings of a few recent studies (Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011; Amir-
Aslani and Mangematin, 2010; Curran et al., 2010; Linstone, 2011), which see the future of 
drug discovery and development in the convergence of technologies and in the trend towards 
personalized  medicine.  During  the  first  phase  after  new  technologies  are  introduced,  the 
discontinuities they represent are not enough to induce major changes in the industry or to 
usher in a new logic:the industry logic remains as it was, and new ventures participate in 
value creation within existing value chain structures. The survival or death of incumbents is 
not  only  due  to  the  competence-enhancing  or  destroying  character  of  technological 
discontinuities - in fact, during this first phase, technological breakthroughs seem to have 
reinforced incumbents’ positions in this industry. Even in the presence of major technological 
changes, while business models remain similar, the logic of the industry remains unchanged. 
But at some point a proliferation of business models emerge that challenge the dominant 
logic: once these supplant existing business models, new industry logics begin to form. It is 
business  model  renewal  at  the  firm  level  that  drives  industry  evolution  -  and  alliances 
between entrepreneurial entrants and large external actors appear to be a key break-point in 
the disruption of the previous dominant logic. When technological discontinuities come from 
start-ups, the dominant logic of the industry evolves slowly – when they are supported by 
diversified  entrants,  we  can  expect  faster  and  more  radical  change  in  dominant  logics. 







































firms’ business models, and this research suggests business model evolution is likely to be 
progressive, a finding that is again consistent with those of other authors (Morris et al., 2005; 
Sosna et al., 2010),  and which further enriches our understanding of the impact of business 
model renewal on dominant logic evolution. We suggest that managers should consider the 
characteristics  of  the  dominant  industry  logic  when  proposing  alternative  or  disruptive 
business models. Our findings argue that the early stages of the introduction of technological 
discontinuities  –  which  are  often  characterized  by  technological  uncertainty  due  to 
competition, both between new technologies and between them and existing technologies 
(Tushman  and  Rosenkopf,  1992)  –  are  less  favorable  to  business  model  innovation.  Our 
results  also  indicate  the  conditions  where  existing  business  models  could  be  challenged: 
where an industry is mature, where profitability is decreasing, where value is created by 
actors  who  cannot  capture  it,  and  where  the  possibility  exists  of  allying  with  powerful 
external actors.  
Analyzing the significant factors that impact competition at times of technological 
discontinuity allows us to propose two managerial implications. First, for incumbents, their 
ability to compete in nascent markets will be based on their ability to negotiate their specific 
complementary assets. Managers should try to detect which of these are likely to become 
significant as the industry evolves, and focus building competence in alliance management - 
and on managing new networks and alliances –as necessary steps for keeping control of value 
capture mechanisms. Second, for new entrants, the first step is to conform to the industry’s 
dominant logic of value creation and capture: once their technology has stabilized, they can 
start deploying new business models challenging one or more of its dimensions: attracting 
new players from other industries may help them in these disruptive efforts. Both incumbents 
and new entrants should consider that they must manage a double issue: complying with the 








































This empirical and theoretical research shows how potential alternatives to the current 
dominant logic have triggered and shaped our drug industry setting, showing the outlines of a 
potential  new  style  of  the  industry,  which  offers  alternative  ways  and  a  more  holistic 
approach  to  delivering  care  and  preventing  diseases.  We  argue  that  government  policies 
should now sustain this emerging industry, and take the opportunity to seek a better balance 
between patients’ and business needs.  
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Appendix 1: List of interviewees for the expert study 
Interviewee 
No.  Detail 
1  Vice-President  (in  charge  of  European  activities)  for  one  of  the  largest  biopharmaceutical 
companies. 
2  Scientific Director in charge of scientific strategy for a world competitive cluster.  
3  Research Director in a National Institute of Health.  
4  Head of the pharmaceutical department at the French Ministry of Finance and Economics.  
5  Research Director in a Centre for the Study of Drug Development.  
6  CEO  of  European  Start-up,  a  nanomedicine  company  working  on  revolutionizing  drug 
delivery. 
7 
Research Director in a National Health Institute & CEO of European Start-up (founded in 
2006)  based  on  a  promising  technology  for  radio  labeling,  preclinical  studies  and 
radiopharmaceuticals synthesis.  
8  Founder and CSO of European Start-up information technology firm that provides customized 
IT solutions for drug development and patient observations 
9  CEO of European biotechnology medium company proposing high value added services for 
drug development.  
10  CEO  of  European  biotechnology  medium  company  dedicated  to  the  discovery  and 
development of product innovations for a specific disease.  
11  CEO  of  European  biopharmaceutical  company  dedicated  to  the  development  of  vaccines 
against infectious diseases. 
12  CSO and co-founder of a European biopharmaceutical company developing drug candidates.  
13  CSO of European biotechnology medium company developing vaccines. 
14  COO of a European biotechnology biopharmaceutical company dedicated to product discovery 
and development.  
15  CFO of European product-based biotechnology medium company.  
16  CFO of European biopharmaceutical company quoted on NASDAQ. 
17  CEO of a large worldwide bioinformatics company. 
18  CEO of a bioinformatics company, major actor of new generation of sequencing instruments. 
19  CEO of an emerging bioinformatics company. 
20  Research Director in an academic laboratory, using bioinformatics tools.  
21  Research Director in a large biopharmaceutical company, using bioinformatics tools.  
22  VP of a chem-informatics company.  
 
















































Changes between inception and 2009  Business 




1  1997  Platform 
technology 
The first BM was based on content providing with core 
strengths in database design. The firm subsequently 
developed competency in software design and analytical 
services to extend the range of its offer (2006).  





2  2004  Platform 
technology 
The company was spun-off a European research 
consortium. The company is in process of implementing 
SaaS (end 2009).  
Platform 
technology  10 
3  2002  Platform 
technology 
Keeping the same business model, the company is 
adding new services to its general offer.  
Platform 
technology  50 
4  2000  Consulting 
services 
The company changed its business model for the 
platform technology to better focus the drug discovery 
market (2001). The bundle business model started in 
2004 to lower the barrier of market entry and increase 
market penetration through commercial relationships 





5  2000  Platform 
technology 
The expertise of the company was so specific that it 
could become a collaborative platform technology in 







6  2001  Platform 
technology 
In 2003 the company changed its strategy and business 
model, repositioning itself as a more generalist scientific 
business intelligence company; and changed its business 
model.  
Software as a 
service  450 





as a service 
Early 2000s the company started transitioning to the 
hybrid business model and partnering with diagnostics 
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